Biden’s CHNV program is now revoked.
532,000 Told to Self-Deport
The Department of Homeland Security issued a Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans
DHS has determined that it is now appropriate and necessary to terminate the CHNV parole programs. These programs do not serve a significant public benefit, are not necessary to reduce levels of illegal immigration, did not sufficiently mitigate the domestic effects of illegal immigration, are not serving their intended purposes, and are inconsistent with the Administration’s foreign policy goals. Regarding previous arguments or determinations that these programs were consistent with the requirement of “urgent humanitarian reasons” for granting parole, DHS believes that consideration of any urgent humanitarian reasons for granting parole is best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with the statute, and taking into consideration each alien’s specific circumstances. These reasons, independently and cumulatively, support termination of the CHNV parole programs.
CBS reports U.S. to Revoke Legal Status of More than a Half-Million Migrants, Urges them to Self-Deport
The Trump administration will be revoking the legal status of hundreds of thousands of Latin American and Haitian migrants welcomed into the U.S. under a Biden-era sponsorship process, urging them to self-deport or face arrest and removal by deportation agents.
The termination of their work permits and deportation protections under an immigration authority known as parole will take effect in late April, 30 days after March 25, according to a notice posted by the federal government.
The move will affect immigrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela who flew to the U.S. under a Biden administration program, known as CHNV, that was designed to reduce illegal immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border by giving would-be migrants legal migration avenues.
A total of 532,000 migrants entered the U.S. under that policy, which was paused soon after President Trump took office, though it’s unclear how many have been able to secure another status that will allow them to stay in the country legally.
How Many from Each Country?
I asked Grok, Musk’s AI engine:
“Trump to deport 532,000 migrants from from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela. What is the breakdown by country?”
Grok Response
While exact breakdowns by country for the 532,000 affected migrants are not explicitly detailed in a single, comprehensive, and up-to-date public source as of March 21, 2025, I can provide an informed estimate based on available data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other reports up to late 2024. The CHNV program, launched in January 2023, allowed up to 30,000 individuals per month from these four countries to enter the U.S., provided they had a U.S.-based sponsor and met vetting requirements. By December 2024, approximately 531,690 migrants had entered under this program, a figure closely aligning with the 532,000 cited in recent reports, suggesting minor updates or adjustments in the final tally.
Here’s an estimated breakdown by country based on historical data and trends:
- Haiti: Haitians have consistently been the largest group within the CHNV program due to severe humanitarian crises, including gang violence and political instability. Reports indicate that the majority of CHNV beneficiaries were Haitian. If we assume a proportional distribution weighted by need and migration patterns, Haiti likely accounts for around 40-50% of the total. This would translate to approximately 212,800-266,000 individuals.
- Venezuela: Venezuelans, fleeing economic collapse and political repression, were the second-largest group. The program initially targeted Venezuelans in October 2022 before expanding, and their numbers grew significantly. Estimates suggest they could represent 25-30% of the total, or roughly 133,000-159,600 individuals.
- Cuba: Cubans, benefiting from unique legal pathways like the Cuban Adjustment Act after a year in the U.S., also utilized the CHNV program heavily. Their share is likely around 15-20%, equating to approximately 79,800-106,400 individuals.
- Nicaragua: Nicaraguans, escaping authoritarian rule, formed the smallest group due to lower overall migration numbers compared to the others. They likely account for 10-15%, or about 53,200-79,800 individuals.
These estimates are derived from:
- CBP data showing 531,690 entries by December 2024, with Haiti noted as the majority contributor.
- Migration trends where Haiti and Venezuela have seen higher outflows (e.g., 7 million Venezuelans have fled globally, and Haiti’s crisis displaced over 1 million internally).
- The program’s equal monthly allocation (30,000 slots split across four countries) adjusted for real-world application rates, where Haiti and Venezuela outpaced Cuba and Nicaragua.
Without an official, itemized breakdown from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or ICE specific to the March 21, 2025, announcement, these figures remain approximate. The precise numbers could shift slightly based on final tallies or unreported variations in program uptake. For instance, some sources suggest Haiti alone could exceed 250,000, but this isn’t universally confirmed.
In summary, the approximate breakdown of the 532,000 migrants targeted for deportation is:
- Haiti: 212,800-266,000
- Venezuela: 133,000-159,600
- Cuba: 79,800-106,400
- Nicaragua: 53,200-79,800
For exact figures, an official DHS release post-March 21, 2025, would be required, which isn’t available as of now.
Expect an immediate court challenge.
This one is headed to the Supreme Court for resolution.
How Many Are Job Holders?
Grok: Without specific data, we can estimate. If we assume a labor force participation rate similar to the foreign-born population (say, 60%), approximately 319,200 of these 532,000 migrants could be job holders. This is a rough estimate, as factors like time since arrival (most entered between 2023 and 2024), regional job markets, and individual circumstances (e.g., language barriers or pending EAD applications) could adjust this number higher or lower.
Some sources suggest high employment motivation among these groups—Cubans, for instance, can pursue permanent residency after a year under the Cuban Adjustment Act, incentivizing work, while Haitians and Venezuelans often qualify for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), also tied to work permits.
What Is the Economic Impact?
Grok: Economic Contributions of CHNV Migrants
These migrants, granted temporary parole and work permits for up to two years, have integrated into the U.S. economy, particularly in states like Florida, Texas, and others with large immigrant communities. Many work in sectors such as hospitality, construction, agriculture, and caregiving—industries often reliant on immigrant labor. For example:
- Labor Force Participation: With work authorization, these 532,000 individuals likely contribute to filling labor shortages. The U.S. has faced persistent labor gaps, with 8.8 million job openings reported in late 2024 (per historical BLS trends), often in low-wage, physically demanding roles that native-born workers are less likely to take.
- Tax Contributions: As legal workers, they pay federal, state, and payroll taxes. Assuming an average annual income of $30,000 (a conservative estimate for entry-level jobs), their collective earnings could exceed $15 billion annually, generating roughly $2-3 billion in tax revenue (based on typical tax rates of 15-20% including income and payroll taxes).
- Consumer Spending: Their wages fuel local economies, particularly in urban hubs like Miami, where Cuban and Haitian communities are concentrated, or Houston, with its Venezuelan population. This spending supports businesses in retail, housing, and services.
Immediate Economic Disruptions from Deportation
Deporting 532,000 workers could trigger several immediate effects:
- Labor Shortages: Industries like construction and hospitality, already strained, would lose a significant portion of their workforce. In Florida, where 25% of construction workers are immigrants (per the American Immigration Council), removing even a fraction of this group could delay projects and raise costs. For instance, Miami’s booming real estate market might see slowdowns, increasing housing prices further.
- Business Losses: Small businesses reliant on immigrant labor—restaurants, landscaping firms, and cleaning services—could face closures or reduced output. A 2017 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated that a 1% reduction in immigrant labor reduces GDP by 0.1-0.2%. Extrapolating, deporting 532,000 workers (roughly 0.3% of the U.S. labor force of 167 million) could shave $20-40 billion off GDP annually.
- Wage Pressure: Reduced labor supply might push wages up in affected sectors, benefiting remaining workers but increasing costs for employers. However, this could also drive inflation, particularly in food and housing, as production costs rise.
Regional Impacts
- Florida: Miami-Dade County, with large Cuban and Haitian populations, could see economic contraction. Hialeah and Doral, heavily immigrant areas, might lose workers in hospitality and retail, disrupting local commerce. Posts on X suggest fear of job losses and family separations in Little Havana and Little Haiti, hinting at reduced economic activity in these cultural hubs.
- Texas: Cities like Houston, with Venezuelan migrants, could see similar effects in oil, construction, and service sectors. The loss of workers might strain an economy recovering from recent energy market volatility.
- Other States: California and New York, with smaller but notable CHNV populations, might face agricultural and caregiving disruptions, respectively.
Costs of Deportation
Executing mass deportation is expensive. Historical estimates from the American Action Forum (2016) pegged the cost of deporting 11 million undocumented immigrants at $400-600 billion over 20 years, or roughly $36,000-55,000 per person. For 532,000 people, direct costs (detention, transportation, legal proceedings) could range from $19-29 billion. Additional expenses include:
- ICE Expansion: Increasing detention capacity beyond the current 40,000 beds (near full as of December 2024) to Trump adviser Tom Homan’s goal of 100,000 beds would require billions in funding, possibly through private contractors or military bases.
- Military Involvement: The Pentagon’s deployment of aircraft and 1,500 additional troops to the border adds to the tab, potentially costing hundreds of millions annually based on past military border operations.
Long-Term Economic Effects
- Remittances: These migrants send money to their home countries, supporting economies in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. In 2023, remittances from the U.S. to Latin America exceeded $150 billion (World Bank). Deportation could cut this flow, destabilizing fragile economies and potentially increasing migration pressure as conditions worsen abroad.
- Community Disruption: Many CHNV parolees have U.S.-born children or ties to legal residents. Deportation could strain social services as families lose breadwinners, offsetting any short-term fiscal “savings” from reduced immigrant presence.
- Investment Deterrence: Businesses may hesitate to invest in regions hit hardest by labor loss, slowing economic growth over time.
Counterarguments and Mitigation
Proponents of deportation argue it could reduce wage suppression for native workers and ease pressure on public resources like housing and healthcare. However, evidence suggests immigrants complement rather than compete with native labor (Cato Institute, 2020), and their tax contributions often exceed their use of services. Replacing 532,000 workers would require significant retraining or immigration from elsewhere, both costly and time-intensive.
Conclusion
Deporting 532,000 migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela would likely cause short-term economic disruption—labor shortages, business losses, and a GDP hit of $20-40 billion—while costing $19-29 billion to implement. Regionally, states like Florida and Texas would bear the brunt, with long-term risks including reduced remittances and investment. The scale of impact depends on execution speed and whether affected migrants secure alternative legal status (e.g., TPS or asylum), but the immediate economic cost could outweigh any fiscal or political gains.
That is an impressive set of answers from Grok. Those cheering may wish to consider the above.
That does not mean I endorse the way Biden went about things. Many of these people were poorly vetted criminals and gang members.
However, Grok’s conclusion is very reasonable: “The immediate economic cost could outweigh any fiscal or political gains.“
Two Economic Shocks
Combined with tariff insanity starting April 2, this country is in for two shocks.
For discussion of the other shock please see Trump’s Tax Hike ‘Liberation Day’ Day Begins April 2. Expect to Suffer
The pre-shocks have begun. But the big shock is on deck.
And in case you missed it, please consider A Clear Explanation of How Reciprocal Tariffs Will Work
There are many conflicting reports on what “reciprocal” means, but I condense things down to the core idea.
Addendum Q&A
Since much of what I said is likely to be taken out of context, and silly questions are already coming in, I am pleased to offer this Q&A.
Silly Reader Q: When will Trump punish the employers of illegal immigrants?
A: Likely never. The governors of Florida and Texas don’t want that, nor does any sensible person who remotely understands what mass deportation of 15 million people would do.
Q: Do you support Biden’s CHNV program?
A: No. It was idiotic flying over 50,000 people here?
Q: What should Trump do?
A: Something other than a shotgun program that the courts are likely to strike down.
Q: Can you be more specific?
A: Sure. I have written ideas already. But I need to refine my response in light of these events. I will do so in a follow-up post.