Trump May Accept the Same Deal with Iran that Obama Already Negotiated

Trump scrapped Obama’s deal. He may be willing to settle for essentially the same deal. Or not.

The answer as to what Trump wants depends on whether you ask Trump or you ask Trump.

Total Dismantlement?

Axios reports Trump will only accept “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program

What they’re saying: “Total dismantlement. Yes, that is all I would accept,” Trump told “Meet the Press” moderator Kristen Welker.

Trump said he is open to hearing arguments in favor of Iran having a civilian nuclear program, which is something that Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also said he supports.

“There’s a pathway to a civil, peaceful nuclear program if they want one,” Rubio said last month on the “Honestly with Bari Weiss” podcast.

The New York Post was equally committal.

Please consider Trump will only accept ‘total dismantlement’ of Iran’s nuclear program

Still, despite saying there was no room for any middle ground, Trump also suggested he’s open to hearing arguments for Iran to be allowed to develop a civilian nuclear program.

Then again, “you know, civilian energy often leads to military wars. And we don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon,” he said.

The addendum falls in line with what US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff have said about America looking to curtail Iran’s nuclear enrichment program rather than eliminate it completely.

Mish to Grok: How does Trump’s demands on Iran differ from the agreement Obama had and Trump scrapped?

Grok ….

1. Core Objective

• Obama’s JCPOA (2015):
  • The JCPOA aimed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons by imposing strict limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. It allowed Iran to maintain a limited, civilian nuclear program under rigorous international oversight.
  • Key restrictions included limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67% purity, capping Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile at 300 kg, and reducing the number of centrifuges. The deal also mandated extensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to ensure compliance.
  • The agreement was time-bound, with some restrictions (e.g., on enrichment levels and centrifuge numbers) set to expire after 10–15 years, a feature critics called “sunset clauses.”
  • The JCPOA focused solely on Iran’s nuclear program, deliberately excluding issues like Iran’s ballistic missile program or regional activities to keep negotiations manageable.
• Trump’s Demands (2025 Negotiations):
  • Trump’s primary demand is that Iran must not possess nuclear weapons, emphasizing “no weaponization” of its nuclear program. His administration has expressed a desire for a “Trump deal” that ensures Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon, potentially permanently.
  • Unlike the JCPOA’s narrow focus, Trump’s demands initially appeared broader, aiming to address not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its ballistic missile capabilities, support for regional proxies (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis), and other “malign activities.”
  • However, recent negotiations suggest Trump may be converging toward a deal resembling the JCPOA, focusing on nuclear restrictions (e.g., limiting enrichment to 3.67%) while sidelining broader demands due to Iran’s refusal to negotiate on non-nuclear issues.

Key Difference:

• The JCPOA was a multilateral agreement with a clear, nuclear-focused framework, accepting Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program. Trump’s approach initially sought a more comprehensive deal but has shown flexibility, potentially settling for nuclear limits similar to the JCPOA’s, despite his earlier criticism of it as “the worst deal ever.”

2. Nuclear Program Restrictions

• Obama’s JCPOA:
  • Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% for civilian purposes, with a stockpile limit of 300 kg. The deal reduced Iran’s centrifuges from ~19,000 to ~6,000 and barred advanced centrifuge use for a decade.
  • The Fordow facility was repurposed for research, and the Arak heavy-water reactor was redesigned to prevent weapons-grade plutonium production.
  • The deal did not require “zero enrichment” (complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear program), as this was deemed unrealistic given Iran’s technical capabilities and national pride.
• Trump’s Demands:

Key Difference:

• Trump initially pushed for a more stringent “zero enrichment” or full dismantlement approach, inspired by the “Libya model” (where Libya completely abandoned its nuclear program). Iran rejected this outright, and Trump’s team appears to be reverting to JCPOA-like limits, though possibly with demands for permanent restrictions rather than time-bound clauses.

3. Ballistic Missiles and Regional Influence

• Obama’s JCPOA:
  • The JCPOA explicitly excluded Iran’s ballistic missile program and its support for regional proxies, as these were seen as separate issues that could derail nuclear talks. Critics, including Trump, argued this was a major flaw, as it allowed Iran to continue developing missiles and funding groups like Hezbollah.
  • Sanctions relief under the JCPOA (unfreezing ~$100 billion in assets and lifting oil sanctions) was criticized for potentially enabling Iran’s regional activities, though much of the funds went to domestic economic needs.
• Trump’s Demands:

Key Difference:

• Trump’s rhetoric emphasizes a holistic approach, targeting Iran’s missiles and regional influence, unlike the JCPOA’s nuclear-only focus. Yet, practical negotiations in 2025 suggest Trump may accept a nuclear-centric deal, as Iran refuses to negotiate broader issues, undermining his initial ambitions.

4. Sanctions Relief

• Obama’s JCPOA:
  • The JCPOA provided significant sanctions relief, including lifting U.S. and EU secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil sector, unfreezing ~$100 billion in assets, and reintegrating Iran into global financial systems. This allowed Iran to ramp up oil exports to pre-sanctions levels.
  • Relief was contingent on Iran’s compliance, with a “snapback” mechanism to reimpose sanctions if Iran violated terms.
• Trump’s Demands:
  • Trump’s negotiations involve sanctions relief as a key incentive, but the extent and permanence of relief remain unclear. Iran demands a full lifting of sanctions, citing its economic crisis (e.g., the rial’s 95% value loss since 2018).
  • Trump’s team has expressed skepticism about providing relief that could fund Iran’s regional proxies or missile programs, suggesting stricter conditions or phased relief tied to compliance.
  • Unlike the JCPOA, Trump may seek U.S. guarantees against future withdrawals, as Iran distrusts the U.S. after Trump’s 2018 exit.

Key Difference:

• The JCPOA offered immediate, substantial sanctions relief with clear mechanisms, while Trump’s approach appears more cautious, potentially tying relief to broader compliance or permanent nuclear concessions. Iran’s demand for guaranteed U.S. adherence complicates negotiations.

5. Negotiation Style and Context

• Obama’s JCPOA:
  • Negotiations were multilateral, involving the P5+1 (U.S., UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) and the EU, with extensive technical discussions over 20 months. The process was diplomatic, with Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry meeting frequently.
  • Iran’s nuclear program was less advanced in 2015, giving negotiators more time to craft a deal. The deal was framed as a diplomatic win for Obama, despite criticism from Republicans and Israel.
• Trump’s Demands:
  • Trump’s negotiations have been primarily bilateral (U.S.-Iran, mediated by Oman), with less involvement from other powers, reflecting his preference for direct deal-making.
  • The urgency is higher in 2025, as Iran has advanced its nuclear program significantly since 2018, enriching uranium to 60% (close to weapons-grade 90%) and stockpiling enough for multiple bombs.
  • Trump’s style is theatrical, emphasizing personal diplomacy (e.g., letters to Ayatollah Khamenei) and threats of military action if talks fail, contrasting with Obama’s methodical approach.
  • Mixed messaging from Trump’s team (e.g., Witkoff’s shifting statements on enrichment) suggests internal disarray, unlike the JCPOA’s cohesive strategy.

Key Difference:

• Obama’s negotiations were structured, multilateral, and patient, leveraging a less advanced Iranian program. Trump’s approach is unilateral, urgent, and chaotic, driven by Iran’s near-breakout capability and his deal-making persona, with military threats as leverage.

6. Criticism and Political Context

• Obama’s JCPOA:
  • Critics, including Trump, argued the JCPOA was too lenient, citing sunset clauses, exclusion of missiles, and sanctions relief that allegedly fueled Iran’s regional aggression. Israel and Saudi Arabia opposed it, fearing it empowered Iran.
  • Supporters, including Obama, argued it was the best realistic option, buying time to delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions and avoiding war.
• Trump’s Demands:
  • Trump’s negotiations face criticism from Iran hawks (e.g., Senator Tom Cotton) and Israel, who argue he’s reverting to Obama’s “dangerous” framework by accepting 3.67% enrichment.
  • Supporters, including some Gulf states like Saudi Arabia (now more open to Iran talks), see a deal as stabilizing, given Iran’s economic weakness and regional setbacks (e.g., losses in Syria and Lebanon).
  • Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 accelerated Iran’s nuclear advances, complicating his 2025 negotiations and drawing irony from critics who note his potential deal mirrors Obama’s.

Key Difference:

• The JCPOA was criticized for its limitations but praised for pragmatism. Trump’s demands face scrutiny for inconsistency and for potentially replicating the JCPOA he derided, with added pressure from Iran’s advanced program and regional volatility.

Critical Analysis

• Trump’s Shift: Trump’s initial hardline stance (full dismantlement, missile restrictions) reflects his campaign rhetoric and criticism of the JCPOA’s flaws. However, Iran’s refusal to negotiate beyond nuclear issues and its advanced program have forced a pragmatic retreat, aligning his demands closer to Obama’s deal. This suggests Trump prioritizes a diplomatic “win” over ideological purity, despite risks of alienating his base.
• Iran’s Leverage: Iran’s economic desperation (95% currency devaluation, oil revenue losses) pushes it toward talks, but its nuclear advances give it leverage to resist dismantlement. The JCPOA was negotiated when Iran was further from a bomb; Trump faces a tighter timeline, limiting his ability to demand more.
• Regional Dynamics: Unlike 2015, when Saudi Arabia opposed the JCPOA, Gulf states now support talks due to warming Iran-Saudi ties and economic diversification goals. This reduces regional pushback but doesn’t guarantee a stronger deal.
• Risks of Failure: Trump’s military threats (e.g., “bombing the likes of which they’ve never seen”) raise stakes, but his reported reluctance to endorse Israeli strikes suggests diplomacy is his preference. A failed deal could escalate tensions, unlike the JCPOA’s de-escalatory effect.

Grok Conclusion

Trump’s demands on Iran initially aimed for a broader, more permanent deal than the JCPOA, targeting nuclear dismantlement, ballistic missiles, and regional proxies. However, Iran’s resistance and nuclear advances have pushed his negotiations toward a framework resembling Obama’s deal, with similar enrichment limits (3.67%) and a focus on verification. Key differences include Trump’s unilateral, threat-heavy approach, emphasis on permanent restrictions, and initial ambition to address non-nuclear issues, though these have largely been sidelined.

The irony, as noted on X, is that Trump may end up with a deal he once called a “disaster,” shaped by the consequences of his 2018 withdrawal.

End Grok – Start Mish

Trump unilaterally killed a deal that even his own department of defense said Iran was honoring.

That deal was one of very few Obama success stories.

After scrapping the deal and getting nothing in return, Iran is now on the verge of nuclear weapons capability.

Given Trump’s cancellation of USMCA on absurd pretenses, is there any reason for Iran to believe Trump will honor any deal he signs?

This is nearly the same setup as Trump killing NAFTA for USMCA then not liking his own deal.

Schrödinger’s Trump

In Trumperland 1 + 1 can be 2, zero, or 11, or all three simultaneously.

Thus, it is entirely possible for there to be a deal in which Iran has no nuclear program plus a nuclear program or an unknown program depending on how Trump feels at the moment.

For discussion of Schrödinger’s Trump, please see Mysterious US Trade Reps Meet With Mysterious China Trade Reps. It’s a Mystery

The unknown meet the unknown discussing the unknown. Let’s discuss Schrödinger’s Cat vs Schrödinger’s Trump.

Thou Shalt Not Buy Iranian Oil

While pondering the mechanics of 1 + 1 = 11, please note Trump says any country that buys oil from Iran will not be allowed to do any business with U.S.

“Any Country or person who buys ANY AMOUNT of OIL or PETROCHEMICALS from Iran will be subject to, immediately, Secondary Sanctions,” Trump said in a post on his social media platform Truth Social. “They will not be allowed to do business with the United States of America in any way, shape, or form.”

Trump in February ordered a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran that aims to completely shut down the Islamic Republic’s oil exports. The president accused Iran in remarks at the White House Thursday of financing militant groups throughout the Middle East.

I somehow sense a problem.

China will not pay any attention to this silliness, nor should they.

Sanctions bite, but Iran’s oil still flows

DW asks Can Donald Trump stop Iran’s oil exports to China?

Despite US efforts to strangle its oil trade, Tehran is still exporting an estimated 1.2 million to 1.5 million barrels of crude per day, according to commodity analytics firms Kpler and Vortexa.

That marks a sharp recovery from mid-2020, when a combination of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic had driven exports to below 400,000 barrels a day.

Most of Iran’s crude is sold at a discount to China, which has emerged as its most consistent buyer despite the threat of US sanctions. Analysts estimate Tehran earns between $30 billion (€26.45 billion) and $40 billion annually from these sales — revenue that supports everything from domestic subsidies to its regional proxy forces.

Iran’s continued oil exports rely on a complex web of clandestine operations that make up a vast gray-market industry, say experts. Tankers frequently go dark by switching off their transponders to evade detection.

Oil is often transferred between ships at sea to disguise its origin, and vessels routinely change names, flags, and registries to create confusion. In many cases, documentation is forged to falsely indicate that the oil originated in countries such as Iraq or Malaysia. 

Chinese refiners benefit from steep discounts, while Beijing refuses to recognize US sanctions against Iran. This thriving shadow industry has raised alarms in Washington, where officials warn that enforcement gaps — especially in Southeast Asia — are undermining global sanctions policy. 

With tariffs at 145 percent already, there is no more harm Trump can do to China without making a bigger mess in the US as well.